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Why Jihadists Want to Kill 
x SIMON COTTEE 
Jun 5 2017, 10:53am 
We must understand that it's a death-wish that attracts would-be 
jihadists toward the ideology of jihadism, not the other way around. 
On Saturday night, seven people were brutally murdered in a jihadist attack on 
London Bridge and Borough Market. Scores more were critically injured. It is the 
third terrorist attack in the UK in as many months. 
 
"Things need to change," said British Prime Minister Theresa May in a speech the 
morning after the carnage of the night before. May is right about that. But everything 
she said was a regurgitation of the same old script: "While the recent attacks are not 
connected by common networks, they are connected in one important sense. They are 
bound together by the single evil ideology of Islamist extremism that preaches hatred, 
sows division and promotes sectarianism." 
"Defeating this ideology," she continued, "is one of the great challenges of our time", 
adding that it "will only be defeated when we turn people's minds away from this 
violence and make them understand that our values ± pluralistic British values ± are 
superior to anything offered by the preachers and supporters of hate". 
 
May is right that "pluralistic values", British or otherwise, are superior to the values of 
hate. But the overwhelming focus of her speech was misplaced. Extremism didn't 
drive a van into defenceless civilians on London Bridge, nor did it go on a stabbing 
rampage at Borough Market: three, as yet unnamed, men did that; men who were 
stopped not by a counter-extremism message, but by armed police. 
 
The relationship between murderous violence and ideology isn't as straightforward as 
May implies. Ideology gives shape to grievances and personal crises, and supplies the 
script for justifying violence. So its causal importance can't be denied. But ideology 
doesn't in itself cause violence. For lethal violence to happen there needs to 
be competent agents with a desire and readiness to perform it. 
 
May is also right to insist that the ideology of extremism should be fought: hateful 
ideologies should be repudiated and exposed. But this won't stop jihadist attacks, 
because the causes of these attacks can't be reduced or simplified to an ideology. 
 
Jihadist attacks occur first and foremost because the attackers want to kill and die. 
This, as Olivier Roy has trenchantly argued in his recent book Jihad and Death, is the 
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unmistakable message of their actions, and it is everywhere emblazoned in their jihadi 
talk. But because the attackers use the rhetoric of religion to justify their attacks, 
shouting "Allahu Akbar" or "this is for Allah" at the moment of slaughter, this blunt 
fact is obscured and the focus shifts to the role of Islam in "driving" the attacks. What 
is obscured is that the desire on the part of the attackers to kill and die invariably 
precedes their exposure to the jihadist ideology. 
To put it another way: it is the wanting ± the killing and death wish ± that animates 
would-be jihadists toward the ideology of jihadism, not the other way around. We 
need to better understand this wanting, but May and her government show little 
interest in figuring it out. 
 
For over 18 months, ISIS has lost huge swathes of territory and is a shadow of its 
former self. But it has left a deadly legacy: the call and warrant for murderous 
violence on the streets of the West. Some have already responded to this ± and more 
will surely follow their murderous example. But the warrant is already out there and 
known. It cannot be undone or erased from collective memory. And no amount of 
proselytising against Islamist extremism and for British values, whatever they are, will 
stop wannabe-jihadists from seeking out the permission of the warrant. 
 
And let's be clear. No one, as terrorism expert Peter Neumann has repeatedly pointed 
out, is radicalised because they "stumble" across extremist content online and become 
"brainwashed". On the contrary: people actively search out extremist content so that 
they can become radicalised, because they want to be radicalised, because what they 
really want is permission to lose themselves to a violent cause. As Roy puts it: 
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become radicals because they have misread the texts or because they have been 
manipulated. They are radicals because they choose to be, because only radicalism 
appeals to them." And the core reason for that appeal, according to Roy, is that it gives 
expression to their profound disaffection and self-loathing. 
 
There is very little that any government can do to derail the delusions of a tiny fringe 
of disaffected, self-hating young Muslims in search of a cause. The more immediate 
challenge, however, is stopping jihadist plots. This isn't going to be easy. It will 
require greater manpower, better intelligence and some luck. It will also require 
building better trust with the communities from which the terrorists come. A renewed 
focus on questioning Islamic religious conservatism is unlikely to help in this. 
 
